See https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f.

The SKS network is vulnerable to certificate poisoning, which can
destroy GnuPG installations. keys.openpgp.org is a new non-SKS keyserver
that is resistant to this type of attack.

With such an attack being possible, it is unsafe to use SKS keyservers
for almost anything, and so we should protect our users from a now
unsafe default. keys.openpgp.org offers some (but not all) functionality
of SKS, and is better than nothing.

This default is only present in gnupg22. gnupg20 and gnupg1orig are not
affected.

See discussion at
NixOS/nixpkgs#63952 (comment).

Upstream commit:

commit 1c9cc97e9d47d73763810dcb4a36b6cdf31a2254
Author: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Date:   Sun Jun 30 11:54:35 2019 -0400

    dirmngr: Only use SKS pool CA for SKS pool

    * dirmngr/http.c (http_session_new): when checking whether the
    keyserver is the HKPS pool, check specifically against the pool name,
    as ./configure might have been used to select a different default
    keyserver.  It makes no sense to apply Kristian's certificate
    authority to anything other than the literal host
    hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net.

    Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
    GnuPG-Bug-Id: 4593

gnupg: change default keyserver to non-SKS

riot-{web,desktop}: 1.2.1 -> 1.2.2

cargo-outdated: fix darwin build

watson: 1.5.2 -> 1.7.0

gitAndTools.hub: 2.12.0 -> 2.12.1