NixOS · Jul 28, 2019 · Jul 29, 2019 · Jul 30, 2019 · Jul 30, 2019 · Jul 30, 2019
diff --git a/pkgs/development/libraries/ffmpeg-full/default.nix b/pkgs/development/libraries/ffmpeg-full/default.nix
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-{ stdenv, fetchurl, pkgconfig, perl, texinfo, yasm
+{ stdenv, fetchurl, fetchpatch, pkgconfig, perl, texinfo, yasm
 /*
  *  Licensing options (yes some are listed twice, filters and such are not listed)
  */
@@ -230,12 +230,17 @@ assert opensslExtlib -> gnutls == null && openssl != null && nonfreeLicensing;
 
 stdenv.mkDerivation rec {
   name = "ffmpeg-full-${version}";
-  version = "4.1.3";
+  version = "4.1.4";
 
   src = fetchurl {
     url = "https://www.ffmpeg.org/releases/ffmpeg-${version}.tar.xz";
-    sha256 = "0gdnprc7gk4b7ckq8wbxbrj7i00r76r9a5g9mj7iln40512j0c0c";
+    sha256 = "1qd7a10gs12ifcp31gramcgqjl77swskjfp7cijibgyg5yl4kw7i";
   };
+  patches = [(fetchpatch { # remove on update
+    name = "fix-hardcoded-tables.diff";
+    url = "http://git.ffmpeg.org/gitweb/ffmpeg.git/commitdiff_plain/c8232e50074f";
+    sha256 = "0jlksks4fjajby8fjk7rfp414gxfdgd6q9khq26i52xvf4kg2dw6";
+  })];
 
   prePatch = ''
     patchShebangs .

diff --git a/pkgs/development/libraries/ffmpeg/3.4.nix b/pkgs/development/libraries/ffmpeg/3.4.nix
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 callPackage ./generic.nix (args // rec {
   version = "${branch}";
-  branch = "3.4.5";
-  sha256 = "0cbzysj9pskxh1kfdwmq2848fn6gi4pvh5y3insv10pdhpcjp8a3";
+  branch = "3.4.6";
+  sha256 = "1s20wzgxxrm56gckyb8cf1lh36hdnkdxvmmnnvdxvia4zb3grf1b";
   darwinFrameworks = [ Cocoa CoreMedia ];
 })
diff --git a/pkgs/development/libraries/ffmpeg/4.nix b/pkgs/development/libraries/ffmpeg/4.nix
@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@
 
 callPackage ./generic.nix (args // rec {
   version = "${branch}";
-  branch = "4.1.3";
-  sha256 = "0aka5pibjhpks1wrsvqpy98v8cbvyvnngwqhh4ajkg6pbdl7k9i9";
+  branch = "4.1.4";
+  sha256 = "01w44ygm5bvc243hlhfnvb2lxfb0blz2cxnphxqgw30vj3c1prx7";
+  patches = [(fetchpatch { # remove on update
+    name = "fix-hardcoded-tables.diff";
+    url = "http://git.ffmpeg.org/gitweb/ffmpeg.git/commitdiff_plain/c8232e50074f";
+    sha256 = "0jlksks4fjajby8fjk7rfp414gxfdgd6q9khq26i52xvf4kg2dw6";
+  })];
   darwinFrameworks = [ Cocoa CoreMedia ];
 })
diff --git a/pkgs/tools/text/gnupatch/CVE-2019-13636.patch b/pkgs/tools/text/gnupatch/CVE-2019-13636.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200
+Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+
+* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
+append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
+the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks.  So far, we were only doing
+that consistently for input files.
+* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
+with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
+---
+ src/inp.c  | 12 ++++++++++--
+ src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c
+index 32d0919..22d7473 100644
+--- a/src/inp.c
++++ b/src/inp.c
+@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+     {
+       if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
+         {
+-	  int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
++	  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ 	  size_t buffered = 0, n;
++	  int ifd;
++
++	  if (! follow_symlinks)
++	    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++	  ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
+ 	  if (ifd < 0)
+ 	    pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+
+@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ static void
+ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ {
++  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+   int ifd;
+   FILE *ifp;
+   int c;
+@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
+
+   if (instat.st_size == 0)
+     filename = NULL_DEVICE;
+-  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
+       || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
+     pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+   if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
+diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
+index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original)
+
+ 	  try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
+ 	  safe_unlink (bakname);
+-	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
++	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
+ 		pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
+@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode,
+ static void
+ copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
+ {
++  int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
+   int fromfd;
+   ssize_t i;
+
+-  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
+   while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
+     {
+@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+   else
+     {
+       assert (S_ISREG (mode));
++      if (! follow_symlinks)
++	to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+       tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
+ 			  to_dir_known_to_exist);
+       copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+ void
+ append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
+ {
++  int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
+   int tofd;
+
+-  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
+   copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+   if (close (tofd) != 0)
+-- 
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
diff --git a/pkgs/tools/text/gnupatch/CVE-2019-13638.patch b/pkgs/tools/text/gnupatch/CVE-2019-13638.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200
+Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell
+command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities.
+---
+ src/pch.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c
+index 4fd5a05..16e001a 100644
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ 	    *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ 	    copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+ 	  }
+-	sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+-		 verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+-		 outname);
+ 	fflush (stdout);
+
+ 	pid = fork();
+@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ 	else if (pid == 0)
+ 	  {
+ 	    dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
+-	    execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
++	    assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
++	    execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char  *) NULL);
+ 	    _exit (2);
+ 	  }
+ 	else
+-- 
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
diff --git a/pkgs/tools/text/gnupatch/default.nix b/pkgs/tools/text/gnupatch/default.nix
@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec {
     })
     # https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=9c986353e420ead6e706262bf204d6e03322c300
     ./CVE-2018-6952.patch
+
+    # https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/patch/?id=dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a
+    ./CVE-2019-13636.patch
+
+    # https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/patch/?id=3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0
+    ./CVE-2019-13638.patch
   ];
 
   nativeBuildInputs = [ autoreconfHook ];